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Foreign direct investment (FDI) 1 in the United States increased sevenfold in the past decade, 2 creating one of the most hotly debated political issues of the late 1980's. Some see increased foreign investment as a threat to our economic independence, political sovereignty, and national security.' Free trade proponents emphasize the positive aspects of FDI, which include creation of jobs, introduction of new technologies and management techniques, and consumer benefits through increased competition. 4 They also cite the United States international commitments to free trade advo- 6. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 282. 7. Although Britain has larger total United States holdings than Japan, see Foreign Investments Top U.S. Holdings Abroad, Washington Post, at Fl, col. 4 (Mar. 14, 1990), fears center on the Japanese "takeover" of United States industries and technology. See, e.g., The Proper Response to Japan's Influence, Bus. WK., July 11, 1988, at 112, 112 (expressing^concern that Japan, "an economic adversary in a way that no other country is," is "manipulatfing] our levers of power"). 12. This Note will consider only constitutional challenges under the dormant commerce clause and Federal foreign affairs powers, although other constitutional attacks on state FDI regulation are possible. For example, if state regulations contravene United States GATT or bilateral treaty commitments, they are void under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which provides that all Federal laws including treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CO sT. art. VI, cl. 2. For a discussion of limitations imposed upon state regulatory powers by United States international obligations, see, e.g., Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967) . A preemption challenge may also invalidate state regulations that conflict with Federal FDI laws, or that frustrate accomplishment of general congressional objectives in regulating FDI. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982) (describing preemption standards). Preemption analysis focuses on congressional intent to ban state regulation as evidenced by enactment of laws in a particular field, while a dormant commerce clause challenge examines whether inherent Federal powers and an overriding Federal interest in uniform regulation preclude state regulation, even absent affirmative exercise of congressional powers. current foreign investment situation, the existing Federal legislation on FDI, and recent congressional and state proposals. Part II examines the constitutional infirmity of proposed state FDI legislation under the dormant commerce clause. Part III argues that state regulation of FDI would infringe upon the exclusive Federal foreign affairs power. The Note argues that in an increasingly globalized economy, where financial transactions occur at the push of a button and corporate structures stretch beyond national boundaries,' 3 the necessary response to the complex challenges of foreign investment must be a unified national policy. The Note concludes that courts should invoke the dormant commerce clause and the Federal foreign affairs power to invalidate state proposals that restrict FDI. These constitutional restraints on state furtherance of purely local interests assure national uniformity in the foreign relations sphere.
I. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has historically maintained an open-door policy towards foreign investment.
14 This policy has theoretical roots in freemarket economic theory, 15 and until World War I had its practical roots in the need to finance the industrialization and expansion of a developing economy. ' Yet in spite of the volume and varied sources of FDI information, the United States may well be suffering from a "data gap"'" that prevents formulation of a coherent policy. Critics assail the uncoordinated efforts among data-collecting agencies, the inaccessibility of information on particular foreign investors, and the incompleteness and inaccuracy of much published aggregate data. 2 There are persuasive reasons for revamping present data collection methods, 3 but the United States must carefully balance the need for better information with its international commitments and budgetary constraints. 3 '
B. Proposed Federal FDI Legislation
Several recent Federal proposals have addressed the need for an improved data analysis system, some by allowing for greater informationsharing among Federal agencies. 3 5 A more controversial proposal is the Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act of 1989,6 also known as the Bryant bill, which would impose new reporting and disclosure requirements on foreign investors.
3 7 Registration information would be compiled in individualized form and made available to a wider range of agencies (including state agencies) and individuals than under any current data collection scheme. 3 37. Foreign investors who hold or acquire an interest of greater than five percent in a United States property would be required to register with the Secretary of Commerce. H.R. 5, supra note 36, at § 2(a)-(b). Stiff civil and criminal penalties would be assessed for violations of the Act. Id. § 2(g) ($10,000 civil fine for late registration); id. § 2(h)(1)-(2) ($10,000 criminal fine, and/or one year imprisonment for willful failure to register; forfeiture of United States interest if convicted of "pattern or practice" of criminal violations under Act).
38. Id. § 2(l)(1)-(2) (access granted to congressional committees, "authorized" GAO officials and employees, one designated agency in each state, and "persons performing qualified research" as determined by Secretary of Commerce).
39. See S. 1379, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S8602 (daily ed. July 24, 1989)(amending and reauthorizing Defense Production Act, including provision to lower standard for presidential blocking of foreign takeovers under Exon-Florio).
40. See H.R. 4308, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Rep. Daniel Rostenkowski) (expanding Internal Revenue Service authority to examine foreign company's records and imposing tax and one bill expands registration requirements for United States agents of foreign principals. 4 1 Several proposals are concerned with reciprocity of investment opportunities. 2 One bill proposes a sector-specific restriction on foreign investment. 43 The Bryant disclosure bill in particular has engendered a storm of criticism. Its detractors argue that it is discriminatory, excessively burdensome, and allows virtual public disclosure of corporate proprietary information, 4 ' which would chill foreign investment at a time when foreign capital is most needed to finance the budget and trade deficits. 4 ' 5 The Bryant proposal has also provoked international responses, including hints of retaliation from other nations. The British government sent notice of its disapproval of the bill to the Congress, decrying its "burdensome and discriminatory nature," and warning that "[i]t will be more difficult for the British government to resist such requirements in the United Kingdom and in the European Community if the United States-the major source of foreign direct investment in Europe-were to introduce them. 44. Among other information, foreign holders of a 5% or greater interest in a United States entity must disclose the market value of the asset. H.R. 5, supra note 36, at § 2(c)(1)-(6). In addition, foreign holders of a 25% or greater interest must disclose more detailed financial and operating information, including balance sheets and income statements, and sales and asset figures. Id. § 2(d)(2)(A)-(C). Confidentiality becomes more difficult the more widely information is disseminated, and public disclosure could disadvantage foreign investors by giving competitors or potential takeover suitors access to proprietary information. Such requirements may create incentives for respondents to distort or omit information and thus could actually lead to less accurate data on FDI. 
C. State Responses to FDI
State policy-makers are also attuned to both the opportunities and challenges presented by FDI. Due in part to President Reagan's "New Federalism," 49 with its emphasis on state initiatives in many areas of domestic policy, states in the last decade have had to assert greater control over their own economic destinies.
Furthermore, the internationalization of industries and the globalization of markets has affected local communities as foreign imports compete with local industries, 50 and as capital flows more freely in and out of state jurisdictions raising the specter of job displacement. 51 States have increasingly gone abroad to attract needed capital and to maximize local employment as more United States firms locate in other countries. 52 Such state initiatives raise problems at the national policy-making level. 53 But concurrently with active promotional campaigns to attract FDI, some states have begun to take a harder look at FDI's impact, proposing a variety of legislative measures 54 § 23-2-3.1-2, -3, -4, -5, -5.5 (Burns 1989)) (requiring inter alia that foreign offeror in corporate takeover action file statement with state securities commissioner disclosing financial sources to be used in takeover and proposed consummation date of takeover; copy of statement must be delivered to target company); Tex. H.R. 2663, 71st Reg. Sess. (1989) (requiring partially or wholly foreign government-owned entity to file statement disclosing interests of greater than 10% in Texas petroleum-related business and imposing screening procedure for foreign acquisition of petroleum-related business); see also 61. See, e.g., Cal. S. 1303, supra note 58, § 12267 ($10,000 civil penalty for failure to file); Ill. H.R. 0566, supra note 58, § § 10-11 ($10,000 civil fine for each week registration is late; $10,000 criminal fine for willful failure to register).
The statement of purpose in one enacted Hawaii bill 62 stresses the "fundamental right" of a community to "shape its own destiny."" 3 Although the bill simply purports to make more explicit the state priorities for investment "irrespective of country of origin," ' 64 its preamble clearly expresses the vaguely defined but strongly felt fears of many local communities concerning the economic impact of outside investment. 6 5 Hawaii also submitted a-resolution to Congress in support of the Bryant disclosure bill, expressing further concerns about the potentially destructive impact of the free flow of capital. 6 6 Besides seeking to minimize the economic impact of foreign competition, states may also be concerned about potential foreign corporate influence in the local political sphere.
Given the states' current lack of access to Federally compiled raw FDI data and the unlikelihood of passage of the Bryant legislation 8 (the only Federal bill proposing information-sharing with state agencies) 9 the states will most likely continue to move to fill the perceived regulatory gap. 0 when it is perceived that negative impacts outweigh the community needs. These negative impacts are almost always expressed in subjective terms such as: loss of local control; a sense of diminishing opportunities; fear that social and economic benefits are occurring at a faster rate to nonresidents than residents; and examples of scarce resources falling into the hands and control of "outsiders."
The free flow of capital can be a productive force in a community. .... However, the free flow of capital left purely to the response of market forces is also capable of engendering destructive forces. In order for a community to achieve maximum benefits and minimize negative results, the free flow of capital must be shaped b, the explicit economic goals of the community as well as its cultural and social objectives. The judicially developed dormant commerce clause doctrine had one of its earliest and most important expressions in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 74 wherein the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that required ships in interstate and foreign commerce to use local pilots when navigating in state waters. The Court distinguished between those areas of commerce that "are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, [and] may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress" ' 7 and those areas where "local necessities" ' demand diverse regulation.
Thus, not all state action affecting commerce is barred; states retain broad power to legislate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their inhabitants 7 7 In order to accommodate both legitimate local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom of interstate trade, courts must appraise the competing state and Federal interests. In conducting this analysis, the Supreme Court has distinguished between "outright protectionism and more indirect burdens on the free flow of trade." 78 Pure protectionist legislation that discriminates on its face against out-of-state actors is subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," 79 while legislation that impacts equally upon both interstate and local business may survive constitutional scrutiny. Arizona products. The Court held that where a state statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, it will be upheld unless the burdens imposed on commerce are clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. The permissibility of the burden depends on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be advanced as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce." 2 Although the state action in Pike advanced an admittedly legitimate local interest, it imposed a clearly excessive burden on commerce by requiring business operations to be performed in Arizona that could more efficiently be performed out-of-state. 8 " The Pike balancing analysis may well be weighted more heavily against state FDI laws since they regulate foreign rather than interstate commerce. Recent Supreme Court cases assert that state infringements on foreign commerce require "more extensive constitutional inquiry" 4 than infringements on interstate commerce since "there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater." 8 5
A. Economic Protectionism and Per Se Invalidity
Proposed state FDI statutes that facially discriminate against foreign investors 6 warrant the strictest scrutiny. 87 85. Id. at 448. There are distinguishable policies behind the grants of the foreign and interstate commerce powers; "the latter was intended to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse as between the States, . . . while the former clothed Congress with that power over international commerce, pertaining to a sovereign nation in its intercourse with foreign nations, and subject . . . to no implied or reserved power in the States." The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 373 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980) (state restrictions burdening foreign commerce subject to more rigorous scrutiny). These decisions seem to have discredited the Court's earlier dictum that the two powers are coextensive. See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578 (1847) ("The power to regulate commerce among the several States is granted to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it.").
86. See bills cited supra notes 58-60. Other bills that merely authorize study of FDI based on already-existing data and do not impose new reporting burdens solely on foreign corporations appear constitutionally sound. See bills cited supra note 57.
87. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (facial discrimination alone may be fatal defect; at minimum, facially discriminatory statutes invoke strictest scrutiny of alleged legitimate local purpose and absence of less burdensome means).
88. Lewis, 447 U.S. at 39. 89. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). them differently." 90 New Jersey had attempted to extend the life of its landfills and minimize the need to convert scarce open lands into new disposal sites by prohibiting out-of-state garbage to enter local landfills. But the state's admittedly legitimate environmental and health concerns did not justify restrictions which discriminated against out-of-state waste; the Court held that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."'" In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 9 2 the Court similarly criticized the protectionist nature of a Florida state law that prohibited ownership of local investment or trust businesses by out-of-state banks and holding companies. While the Court by-passed the per se rule to hold that disparate treatment of out-of-state enterprises was not justified as an incidental burden necessitated by legitimate local interests, its strong language suggests that the Florida statute could as easily have been stricken as per se invalid. 93 Although protectionist in nature, most state FDI proposals impose burdens short of the explicit prohibition of foreign participation in state markets evident in City of Philadelphia and Lewis. 94 It is at least arguable that they may thus survive invalidation under the per se test.
B. Intentional Discrimination
Many of the state bills betray a clear purpose of protecting local economic interests by means of burdening only participants in foreign commerce. For example, one Texas bill imposes a screening requirement on entities with any amount of foreign government ownership that seek to acquire a petroleum-related business. 9 5 Approval depends on an assessment of the "best economic interest of th[e] state." 9 6 But domestic corporations may acquire a Texas petroleum-related business without undergoing this process. Such intentional discrimination against commerce places squarely on the state the burden of justifying local benefits and of showing 95. See Tex. 2663, supra note 58, § 3. Presumably, the screening requirement would apply to even those corporations with as little as one percent foreign government ownership. Id. § 1(1) (foreign corporation subject to requirement is one "any part of which is owned by a government of a foreign country").
96. Id. § 3.
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives. 9 7 This would prove a difficult burden since the Supreme Court has refused to recognize vague appeals to the interest of local economic control made by states seeking to protect their markets from foreign penetration. 9 States may indeed need more information about FDI before its true impacts on local economies can be assessed. But it is doubtful that a vague a priori argument of potentially "destructive forces" ' 9 9 will be adequate to justify intentionally discriminatory data-gathering techniques or screening procedures that place even minimal burdens on the more strictly guarded zone of foreign commerce.
C. Legitimacy of State Interests, Rational Relation of Legislation, and Balancing of Burdens
State regulations that affect commerce will be upheld under Pike if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest that outweighs any burden imposed upon commerce, and there is no less burdensome way to effectuate the desired goals.
None of the identifiable interests underlying state FDI proposals seem justifiable under the Pike balancing test. State FDI regulations that seek to protect the local economy from potentially negative effects of foreign competition, if not per se void as pure economic protectionism,'" 0 are invalid since they are not rationally related to the desired ends. There is no evidence that a foreign corporation located in a particular state is any more likely to close down its operations, displace workers, or otherwise threaten the local economy than a domestic counterpart. In fact, foreign investors often buy facilities discarded by United States firms relocating abroad.' 0 ' Furthermore, the definition of "foreign" in several of the state bills would include many domestically-owned corporations with major operations located abroad.' 0 2 A more rational and less discriminatory solu- 98. In almost any Commerce Clause case it would be possible for a State to argue that is has an interest in bolstering local ownership, wealth, or control of business enterprise. Yet these arguments are at odds with the general principle that the Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside competition. Lewis, 447 U.S. at 43-44 (citations omitted).
99. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing Hawaii's articulation of threatened local interest).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94. 101. See July 1989 Hearing, supra note 21, at 233 (statement of Richard F. Celeste, Governor of Ohio); see also supra note 51 (describing potential for foreign corporations to re-employ displaced workers).
102. See, e.g., Ill. H.R. 0566, supra note 58, § 2(f)(2) (foreign person includes "any business enterprise that is organized under the laws of a foreign government or which has its principal place of business outside of the United States"); Ind. S. 89, supra note 58, § 5(b)(1) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-5.5(b)(2) (Burns 1989)) (foreign corporation is one "incorporated under a law other tion, given that analyzing currently available data may be inadequate," 0 3 would be to collect and evaluate data from both foreign and domestic corporations.
FDI proposals also largely fail in their attempts rationally to address potential foreign influence in local politics. A foreign-incorporated or foreign-owned entity does not necessarily espouse the political agenda of its domiciliary nation; corporate goals are predominantly economic rather than political. 1 4 At some level of foreign government ownership, though, it would be more rational to presume that the corporation seeks to advance the interests of the foreign nation. But less burdensome alternatives exist for meeting this concern: States could directly regulate foreign lobbying practices or restrict foreign PAC contributions to state campaigns, and thereby avoid discriminating against or burdening foreign commerce at all.
To the extent that state measures attempt to solve more national problems, such as promotion of the United States' general industrial competitiveness or insistance upon international reciprocity of investment incentives, 1 " 5 they infringe upon the proper domain of Congress in regulating affairs with foreign nations.' 0 8
While asserted state interests are vague, the potential burdens of state FDI regulations are not entirely clear either. Many states' registration requirements impose no greater burdens than those already imposed under IITSSA.'1 7 Yet even the cost of duplicitous filings may be impermissibly burdensome where state interests are not demonstrably legitimate. One clearly significant burden is the threat of state-imposed civil and criminal penalties' 0 8 upon a foreign corporation for nondisclosure or nonregistration when the foreign investor has already complied with Federal requirements.
Cries that any new burdens imposed would "chill foreign investment" or invite retaliation are not unfounded, as the British government's letter to Congress voicing concern over the Bryant proposal attests.' 09 Further-more, leaving it to the states to enact a hodgepodge of different FDI requirements also creates a significant danger of inconsistency in an area where the nation must present a unified front in its dealings with international commercial partners.
D. The Need for Uniformity in Regulating Foreign Commerce
The need for national uniformity is particularly urgent in the regulation of foreign commerce" 0 and transcends the balancing analysis. Thus, the Supreme Court in Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles"' struck down a California property tax on Japanese cargo containers on the grounds that it would prevent the nation from "speaking with one voice"" ' 2 in regulating foreign trade. The Court did not invoke any notions of balancing of interests and burdens, but instead stressed the possibility of international dispute and foreign retaliation against United States domestically-owned enterprises. 1 1 The court concluded that the burdening of foreign corporations' decisions to do business through subsidiaries in the state threatened to offend the United States' trading partners and provoke retaliation." 9 These cases suggest that, if neither per se invalidity nor traditional commerce clause balancing will suffice to strike down discriminatory state FDI regulations, the uniformity doctrine will sound their death knell. Particular state regulations, appropriately drafted, may create mere "resonances" in foreign commercial intercourse if they affect both domestic and foreign entities equally. But most state FDI bills impose requirements likely to disproportionately burden a foreign corporation's decision to conduct business in a particular state 20 and raise the threat of foreign retaliatory measures.
Some state FDI regulations may impose burdens that only minimally raise a foreign investor's costs of doing business in the state. But when taken together, these state regulations have a serious "potential to disfavor a particular mode of foreign participation"'' in United States markets. Courts have considered the potential aggregate effects of individual activity on interstate commerce to be sufficient to justify congressional action in analogous "active" commerce clause cases. 2 2 and should also restrain potential aggregate state burdens on foreign commerce in the dormant commerce clause context.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE FDI REGULATIONS UNDER
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
The power of the Federal government over foreign affairs is exclusive and "plenary."' 23 The sources for this plenary power are largely found in the Constitution, which vests in the national government explicit powers to deal with a vast array of transnational problems.' branches, 25 the states clearly are denied major participation in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. The Constitution explicitly prohibits states from entering any "Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," from imposing import or export duties, from entering any "Agreement or Compact" with foreign powers, and from engaging in war. 12 6 Judicial constraints imposed under the dormant commerce clause doctrine, particularly the uniformity principle in the foreign commerce context, have further prevented the states from intruding into the realm of foreign relations. x2 State infringements into the Federal foreign affairs domain are prohibited even where commerce is not involved. 3 ' declared unconstitutional a state Buy-American government procurement statute as an "attempt by the state to structure national foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies."' 3 9 The court warned of the dangers that would develop if Federal policy were to be shaped by the states' differing interpretations and concluded that only the Federal government can determine standards for fair competition with its international trading partners. 4°T wo other state cases have taken a more limited view. In K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission,' 4 ' the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the state's Buy-American requirement for government purchases, narrowly interpreting Zschernig to prohibit only "refined inquiries into foreign ideologies." ' 142 Since the New Jersey Buy-American act applied "without any discrimination based on the ideology of the seller's country,"' 4 3 it was beyond the scope of Zschernig.
In Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 14 4 the Maryland Court of Appeals similarly limited Zschernig when it upheld a Baltimore ordinance requiring city pension funds to divest their holdings in companies doing business in South Africa. The court held that the regulation's impact on South Africa (and the resultant threat of retaliation) was "minimal and indirect,"' 4 5 and thus did not intrude upon the Federal government's conduct of foreign relations.' 46 State FDI measures intrude upon broader areas of international trade than both the state Buy-American procurement regulations, which limit their scope to government purchase of goods, and the divestment regulations which do not apply to private business transactions . 4 These greater burdens, combined with the complexity and volatility of modern international investment issues, mandate invalidation of state FDI regulations. Such a result would follow the spirit, if not the letter, of Zschernig.
IV. CONCLUSION
International trade issues are increasingly vital to foreign diplomacy. On this matter, and in the realm of international relations generally, the nation must speak with "one voice," not fifty. Given the debate at the national level, it is difficult to identify the "one voice" with which the nation will speak on the issue of foreign investment. Nevertheless, compromise must be hammered out on the Federal level in order to ensure protection of vital national economic needs and respect for international commitments.
Perhaps some resolution that allows for greater coordination of state and Federal efforts in the FDI data collection and analysis process will better serve to satisfy local as well as national needs. Clearly, however, recent state initiatives to take the matter into their own hands seriously threaten the implementation of a unified Federal policy and cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. The dual restraints of the dormant commerce clause and the exclusive Federal foreign affairs power ensure that "[njo state can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic 
